Forget the plot theories and go for the evidence
 
Friday, November 15, 2002
The hunt for the Bali bombers
 
HONG KONG Although arrests have been made and confessions announced, a month after the Bali bombing it is not clear that the key perpetrators have been identified. Even if those named so far are actually the main culprits, it may be a hard job to convince skeptics who worry that a resolution of the case will be driven more by political than forensic factors.
.
Uncertainty is adding to tensions within Indonesia, around Southeast Asia and between some regional states and the West. A convincing case against those responsible is badly needed if the gap between Western assumptions about Islam in Southeast Asia and an Indonesian predilection for plot theories is to be bridged.
.
The strong probability remains that Bali was an Al Qaeda operation assisted by Indonesians. However, this is as yet far from being the open and shut case presented by much of the Western media. To them it was simply an Al Qaeda act helped by its Southeast Asian ally, Jemaah Islamiyah, which is claimed to be headed by the Indonesian cleric, Abu Bakar Bashir and has Riduan Isamuddin, a.k.a. Hambali, as its terrorist mastermind with allies in Malaysia, southern Thailand and southern Philippines.
.
This easy-to-follow theory has been pushed by Western diplomats and by some government-linked strategy institutes in Asia. It fits with pre-Bali Western demands that Indonesia arrest Bashir and others. Bali was thus the result of Indonesia's failure to act tough and detain people without trial.
.
However, most claims of such conspiracies rely on alleged confessions of detainees in the United States and Singapore that have not been tested in courts. There is unofficial skepticism about some of the claims and concern that the anti-terror effort is sometimes more a question of scoring domestic political points, or looking good in Washington's eyes, than in finding those actually involved in violence. Some foreign experts doubt that Jemaah Islamiyah even exists as an organization.
.
As for Bali, many Indonesians are as likely to see domestic as much as Al Qaeda origins in the tragedy. Jakarta is prone to conspiracy theories. Nonetheless there is enough evidence of involvement of members of Kopassus, Indonesia's special forces, in the Aug. 31 killing of American teachers in Papua and the car bomb at the Jakarta stock exchange in 2000 to suspect they are capable of it.
.
There are Islamists who support the Laskar Jihad militia which has led violence against Christians in Maluku and Sulawesi. Others may back violence to undermine the Indonesian government. Still others are smarting from the loss of East Timor and would like to take revenge on Australia or frighten away foreigners so they can deal with secessionism in their own brutal fashion. So there are possible motives - but no evidence.
.
Yet there are enough Indonesians suspicious enough of the military, skeptical of the police and justice system, or in denial of the capabilities of their own Islamic extremists, who will continue to believe it until very strong contrary evidence is presented. Any military involvement, however tangential, would be embarrassing for those who want closer relations with the military to maintain Indonesian stability. Another danger is the bracketing with terrorism of peaceful advocates of fundamentalist views. The Islamist sense of victimization is strong enough already, and is fueled by opportunistic politics. In Malaysia for instance, democratically elected representatives of the Parti Islam have been branded with vague allegations of connections to Jemaah Islamiyah or its supposed Malaysian offshoot, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia, and detained without trial.
.
Focus on Islam may be fostering a Southeast Asian Muslim identity. At the same time, it is easy to exaggerate the international scope of local minority problems. Violence in southern Thailand is often assumed to be linked to international terrorism when it has long been endemic. Recent bombings in southern Thailand, for instance, were more likely due to local political feuds than the work of separatist Malay-speaking Muslims. In the interests of regional stability as well as justice, the culprits, not scapegoats or pawns, must be found and convincingly prosecuted. International Herald Tribune

< < Back to Start of Article
  Print Article Text Larger Text Small Single Column Multi Column