Philip Bowring: Asia is waiting to see how America handles victory
 
Philip Bowring IHT
Thursday, April 17, 2003
Postwar strategy
 
HONG KONG As Asian countries rethink strategic policies in the light of the Iraq war, it is postwar U.S. bahavior, rather than the war itself, that will ultimately shape their responses.
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Has the war strengthened the cause of the unilateralists and preemption advocates? Or will military triumph soon be seen as a pyrrhic victory bought at huge diplomatic cost? In the latter case Washington may, when euphoria cools, re-emphasize alliances. Those questions are of immediate concern for Europe and the United Nations, but they are also relevant for Korea now and, in the long term, for all Asia.
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There was little popular support for the Iraq war in Asia and only lukewarm backing from allies. Negative reaction was founded on historical resentment of Western imperialism and missionary zealotry, and of the U.S. assumption that it is entitled to change other nations' regimes whether or not they are a credible threat to the United States.
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Among Muslims the resentment was more emotional. But for many East Asians, criticism was tempered by a sense that "what is good for the United States is good for us," an appreciation of America's contribution to peace and prosperity in the region.
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Throughout Asia, official responses have been governed by pragmatism. Whatever they might think, governments saw no point in antagonizing Washington over a matter that did not directly concern them. Now, in the aftermath of victory they will seek reward.
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Japan and South Korea, in particular, hope that they can keep the United States on a multilateral and diplomatic course over North Korea. China earned praise for muting its opposition to the war and now hopes that apparent softening of Pyongyang's position on negotiations will be seen as more a result of its influence than that of the war.
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The prewar shift of U.S. policy from deterrence to preemption had aroused plenty of concern in the region, but only in South Korea did discussion of its consequences get beyond the academic.
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The United States is able to impose its military will anywhere in the world and now appears to believe that allies are useful but not essential in protecting its global interests. So should the response in Asia be to view America now as an unreliable ally that will follow its own national agenda regardless of the views and interests of allies? Or is it so powerful that wisdom lies in compliance with its interests?
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There is a military technology dimension to this too. Is U.S. dominance, particularly in the air, reducing its need for permanent bases in countries such as Japan and South Korea, thereby weakening the bonds of mutual self-interest?
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On North Korea, the United States seems to have little option but dialogue other than a preemptive strike, the thought of which horrifies all of East Asia. Iraq may well have strengthened Pyongyang's determination to keep its nuclear capability unless it can get cast-iron security guarantees from America.
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As for Seoul, in the longer term it is looking less to the United States for protection and more toward a return to its historical game of balance of power, notably between the interests of Japan and China.
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In Japan, foreign policy is as moribund as economic policy and friction with America is minimal. But the combination of China's rising military might and concern at U.S. unilateralism will probably provide support for those who believe that Japan must be more self-reliant, especially on issues of strategic weapons.
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China, on the other hand, having viewed another demonstration of U.S. military power, will have noted America's potential to defend Taiwan with air power alone. That may temporarily dampen Beijing's enthusiasm for strategic weapons development and power projection in the South China Sea.
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It seems likely there will be longer-term economic fallout for Asia. The globalization of the 1990s, spearheaded by America and its multinational companies, placed economic growth and free movement of goods and capital above nationalism and promoted shared principles in economics and common rules in commerce. These fertilized China's remarkable rebirth.
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Now the United States is perceived as having undermined those rules and values at a time when its own economy, burdened with an unsustainable trade deficit, alarming level of private debt and now the costs of war, seems unlikely to provide a lead for Asia.
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Asia will keep its own collective counsel but will watch closely to see how the United States now deals with its conquest and with those who opposed the war but are needed to win the peace: Iraq's neighbors, some NATO allies and the United Nations.

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