HONG
KONGImpending legislation on treason, subversion, sedition, secession
and theft of state secrets is a serious threat to Hong Kong's open and
international status. But what look likely to be bad and loosely drafted laws
are not just a concern in themselves. The process is again demonstrating the
flaws in Hong Kong's political structure. It is not just undemocratic. Major
decisions are often made with scant regard for the wider public interest or a
thought-through plan to optimize Hong Kong strengths. Often they merely reflect
the interests of entrenched commercial groups and Beijing-aligned political
figures. They have had negative consequences for the domestic economy and now
threaten to spill over into international business.
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Some subversion legislation was required
by Article 23 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong's mini-constitution. It is also
apparent that in any event Beijing will enforce its will on Hong Kong if it
feels that national security is threatened. Western criticisms of the proposed
legislation are vulnerable to accusations of hypocrisy after post-Sept. 11
assaults on civil liberties in the name of security. The Hong Kong government
may yet listen to the concerns raised, but the omens are not good. Instead of
issuing a draft bill for discussion, the government has short-circuited the
process by issuing a consultation paper. It is written in fuzzy language which,
if translated into legislation, would, in the wrong hands, result in now
innocent activities becoming crimes.
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It is not just journalists who fear that
offenses such as unauthorized disclosure of state secrets will be used to
silence them. The measure could also be used against publication of economic
data and forecasts. Even without any laws, bank economists are reluctant to
openly debate the merits of Hong Kong's currency peg for fear of being accused
of inciting speculation against it.
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All media, including those which use Hong
Kong for satellite links, are worried that coverage of separatist activities in
Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang could be deemed secessionist or that sympathetic
treatment of democratic movements within China could be deemed seditious.
Although Hong Kong may trust its own courts to interpret laws flexibly, it
cannot trust its own government, which went to Beijing to get an inconvenient
decision of its Court of Final Appeal overthrown.
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Even foreign chambers of commerce,
usually reluctant to express political opinions, have urged the government to
think again.
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So why is Hong Kong charging down a road
which runs contrary to its interests as an international center, and to the
interests of its people in preserving freedoms? Beijing has insisted that more
than five years after the handover it is time for Article 23 legislation to be
enacted. But Beijing leaves the all-important details to Hong Kong. The devil is
in the details. Beijing has always had a high level of tolerance for Hong Kong's
freedoms. The problem lies not with Beijing but with Hong Kong's leaders. Some
want to second-guess Beijing and appear "more Catholic than the pope." Others
hope that wearing patriotism on their sleeve will bring mainland business
rewards. Others believe in some supposedly neo-Confucian right of elite rule,
treating democratic and legislative procedures with contempt. The main change
here since 1997 is that the commercial and political elites have increasingly
merged at the expense of the legislature and the civil service. The monopolies
and oligopolies which dominate the domestic economy have become more entrenched,
inhibiting competition and hurting Hong Kong in general and its dynamic small
business sector in particular.
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Hong Kong now often seems run by and for
the sons of the last generation of wealth creators. It starts with Chief
Executive Tung Chee-hwa, none too successful inheritor of his father's shipping
empire. Hong Kong's princelings, descendants of commercial empire builders, are
found in profusion in the Executive Council and government bodies. Over
everything loom the property developers, who also dominate utilities and
retailing. Despite a huge budget deficit, the government recently made another
effort to jack up still high property prices by halting land and apartment
sales. Officials talk of integration with Guangdong but refuse to open the
border for 24 hours a day, to protect property prices. Hong Kong looks like
Japan, with old interests so entrenched that measures to stimulate competition
and encourage new enterprises are avoided.
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Article 23 legislation is another chapter
in the book of Tung's failure to lead Hong Kong and represent its wider
interests. It reflects the lack of accountability of the elite which dominates
his so-called ministerial system. The legislation is a symptom of the exclusion
from government of a well-educated public and confirms the view that Hong Kong
is moving in the opposite direction to most of East Asia, China included.
International Herald Tribune