Bangladesh faces dilemmas over
exploitation of its two major natural resources, gas and geography.
For now, suspicion of India is winning out over economic benefits.
IHT May 28.
by Philip Bowring
Dhaka: Should a poor
country squirrel scarce capital for fear
of a rainier day in
the future, or invest now in a better
tomorrow? Should a
relatively small country protect itself by
closing up or opening
to a giant neighbour?
Bangladesh faces both
these issues and so far is tending
towards pessimistic
answers, frustrating those who think it
has more potential
than its government assumes.
Both questions come
together in the matter of natural gas, the
one exportable commodity
of which Bangladesh has a potentially
large surplus. But
how much of a surplus and for how long? And
should it be sold to
India -- the only viable export market.
Would not that make
Bangladesh even more beholden to its giant
neighbour?
Bangladesh has proven
ackowledged reserves of a solid if
unexceptional 10 trillion
cubic feet (tcf) of gas, and
probably at least another
5 tcf of proven and unannounced
reserves. However potential
is vastly greater according to
industry experts. They
believe that finding as much as 50 tcf
on could be achieved
given intensive drilling in easily
accessible locations
both onshore and offshore in the
relatively shallow
Bay of Bengal.
International companies
were till quite recently keen to sign
up to exploration contracts
on the assumption that prospects
were good and markets
in India, including industrialised,
densely populated,
energy deficient West Bengal which could be
reached by exension
of the existing gas grid. However, falling
energy prices and the
ongoing ban on gas exports has
discouraged the very
exploration which ought to make
Bangladesh more comfortable
about selling gas.
Just exporting 500 million
cubic feet a day would use up only
3.5 tcf over 20 years
yet earn $500 million a year. Bangladesh
will to have to export
if domestic gas consumption, which must
be partly paid for
in dollars and is subsidised in terms of
local currency, is
not to put the fragile balance of payments
under even greater
strain.
Ironically, domestic
consumption is another problem for
producers. It has not
been growing as fast as expected due to
delays in building
power stations so that even new gas fields,
such as developed by
Unocal in the northeast which was
inauguarated last month,
will be operating at well under
optimum capacity. Reduced
cash flow as well as uncertain sales
prospects are likely
to discourage further exploration.
One anwswer to nationalist
objections to selling gas might be
to export downstream
products -- electricity and fertiliser
instead. But these
require massive inputs of capital which
Bangladesh does not
have. Indian investors might be willing to
finance a major power
project on the border, but that would
require a level of
self-confidence and decision making that
has been lacking in
Dhaka, which has singularly failed to meet
even local power needs.
So the conversion option for now
remains theoretical.
The result of failure
to pursue gas possibilities vigorously
leaves Bangaldesh expecially
vulnerable at a time when the
phasing out of quotas
could leave it successful garment
exports facing greater
competition, and hinders investment in
infrastructure which
could spur new industries.
The India issue may
be more crucial than the size of gas
reserves. Apart from
a hill-country border with Burma,
Bangladesh is surrounded
by India, which makes many worry
about Indian pressure
and influence. But look at the map
another way. Bangladesh
commands the northern end of the Bay
of Bengal, the deltas
of two great rivers and a seaport and
railway system which
were once -- and could easily be again --
the gateway to northwest
India, now reached from the rest of
India via a narrow
corridor bordered by Bangladesh and Bhutan.
Many believe Bangladesh
would strengthen its position by being
more open to India,
and making efforts to improve rail and
river communication
and earn good from transit business.
There are reasonable
suspicions of India. Upstream water
shortages have meant
that it has got the raw end of a deal on
Ganges water sharing.
India has shied away from multilateral
projects which agencies
such as the Asian Development Bank
have been encouraging
in the region, or even those under SAARC
(South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation). It prefers
to use its weight in
bilateral discussion. Lack of Indian
reciprocity to Bangladesh
tariff cutting has enabled Indian
manufacturers to increase
their share of the local market.
But whether from an
economic or geopolitical perspective,
Bangladesh might be
better advised to leverage its few
strengths -- gas and
geography -- in way which would promote
local development and
make India more dependent on Bangladesh
than can ever by the
case while Dhaka adopts a defensive
posture.
ends
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