HONG
KONGThe explicit decision of the United States to use diplomacy instead
of force to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis is an example of how useful
a united front by allies and neutrals can be in avoiding rash responses or
adventurist escapades. With North Korea's four immediate neighbors - South
Korea, China, Japan and Russia - all determined that the issue must be
contained, Secretary of State Colin Powell may have been relieved to find that
the United States had little alternative but to go along, whatever the natural
instincts of hawks playing war games in Crawford, Texas. If some of those in
power in Washington seriously believe that Asia's problem is that it is divided
and thus unable to deal firmly with North Korea, perhaps they should make a trip
to Asia. They would find almost unanimous agreement that the way to deal with
North Korea is not military confrontation or a quick strike on some facility.
.
Indeed, it is troubling to those who live
nearest the North Korean "nuclear threat" to imagine that a preemptive strike is
even contemplated against a country whose threat is now seen as more rhetorical
than real and which uses the nuclear issue as its main diplomatic weapon.
.
Quite probably, U.S. exaggeration of the
dangers to the region of the North's actual or intended strategic weapons has in
the past helped Pyongyang extract more money than would otherwise have been the
case. This and the Washington-Pyongyang standoff over diplomatic relations have
also helped China extract concessions on other issues in return for pressure,
real or imagined, on the North.
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It is a moot point whether North Korea
has a grievance over the supply of reactors. What is clear is that the other
players are trying to use economic and trade means to pry open the North. Recent
policy changes there suggest that they have not been entirely unsuccessful. All
the neighbors are irritated by Pyongyang, but they have no intention of letting
their long-term goals of enticing change in the North be set aside in favor of
rash actions for narrow aims. The Asian response to the Korean issue should be
seen as an example to Europe to talk sense into U.S. policy toward Iraq. The
European Union ought to have been able to devise a policy which would have fit
within the NATO context to defuse the Iraq crisis or avert a rush to war. It
could probably have found common ground with Russia and Turkey as well as with
many in Washington, in the same way that East Asian states with disparate
starting points, ideologies and interests have found much common ground over
Korea. If Tony Blair were not so keen on his role as George W. Bush's PR man and
Britain were not so keen to punch above its weight in world affairs, a coalition
of secondary powers could well have played that role over Iraq. Perhaps, if they
look at Korea, they still will.