Published on Thursday, July 13, 2000
Give the buyer a chance to
beware
PHILIP BOWRING
Caveat emptor, buyer beware, is at all times the most important
consideration for investors. The Government is not responsible if
the public is dumb enough to throw yet more money into the Li
Ka-shing extended-family coffers by paying silly prices for shares
in such cyberspace confections as tom.com. The public should also by
now have learned to believe absolutely nothing which comes out of
the mouths and ''research'' of the salespeople from that sleaziest
of glossy occupations, investment banking.
Likewise, the Government was not responsible when those with
access to easy money from banks speculated in the property market in
1997, buying one, two, three flats in addition to the one they
already owned and occupied.
The sight of Liberal Party members demonstrating for higher
property prices and expecting sympathy for failed property
speculators was almost comical. However, do not suppose it would
have no effect on the Government. After all, Chief Executive Tung
Chee-hwa knows what it is like to be a failed speculator in his case
ordering dozens of new ships at the wrong time and then having to be
bailed out by his friends in Beijing when his family shipping
business almost went bankrupt in the mid-1980s.
This was accompanied by some arm twisting by his creditors and
the usual Hong Kong shuffling of assets between private and
publicly-owned companies. (Family values, it seems, are particularly
valued when they can be exercised at the expense of the public.)
Official sympathy for those with negative equity in property is
not surprising from a government which seems to truly believe that
the strength of the property market is essential for Hong Kong,
rather than being a reflection of the health of the economy at
large. This nonsensical economics then justifies all kinds of
interventions to bail out speculators who include those ranking
government officials who bought investment properties on borrowed
money and add to the fortunes of the handful of property tycoons.
(Interesting, is it not, that the Hong Kong-based businessmen deemed
worthy of being received recently by President Jiang Zemin were
mostly from the property sector?)
The Government itself should also be showing greater respect for
caveat emptor in its own investments. Following the August 1998
massive stock market intervention, it was said that the Government
would be an entirely passive investor and not attempt to interfere
in the companies in which it had invested by virtue of buying all
the Hang Seng Index component stocks. So one might have expected it
to abstain on the issue of Cable & Wireless HKT approving the
Pacific Century CyberWorks (PCCW) bid. Curiously, however, it voted
in favour, even though many public shareholders were very unhappy at
having to accept the inflated PCCW paper. One trusts that whoever
made this decision will not surface later as an ex-government
official supplementing an already generous pension with a job with
the Li family.
The public, meanwhile, needs much better protection than it seems
to be getting from the institutional investment fraternity, and the
auditors. Individual investors must take care of themselves. But who
is to protect the vast majority soon to be forced by the Government
to save through the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF)? Companies will
have a choice of MPF providers, and of levels of risk for plans, but
individuals have little influence on this and almost none at all on
specific investments. So one would expect that as a matter of duty
to savers, the institutions which will be looking after (for a large
fee) the enforced savings of the people would be taking a lead to
ensure that managements, particularly of family-controlled
companies, did not get away with abusing the rights of public
shareholders.
The log of such cases is long and continuous. This past week, for
instance, has brought us yet another example, this time from Dickson
Poon trying to avoid revealing a deal to pay his private company
$130 million for cyber services, of which it had no previously known
expertise, and another $110 million for hardware, to be supplied to
the public company, Dickson Concepts, prior to the listing on the
Growth Enterprise Market of its recently created cyber subsidiary.
This was so outrageous that even the stock exchange insisted that Mr
Poon make it a notifiable transaction. But meanwhile there has been,
as usual, silence from institutional investors who hold, in trust on
behalf of pension schemes and such like, shares in the public
company.
That is the norm in Hong Kong where abuse of outside shareholders
is an almost daily occurrence and one which is occasionally
challenged by a particularly irate or selfless private investor, but
almost never by the so-called professionals. The notion that
managements and directors have a duty of trust to all shareholders
is not taken very seriously, even though it is enshrined in criminal
as well as civil law.
The fact is that the institutions are part of a
''let's-not-rock-the-boat'' or ''overturn-the-trough'' circle of
brokers, fund managers, investment banks, auditors, trustee
companies and supervisory authorities. Blowing the whistle on the
well-connected Mr X would not do much for other business, would it?
Why, there might even be a few nasty questions about how a famous
auditing firm came to sign off on yet another set of dubious
red-chip accounts. Or you personally might be cut off the list of
favoured pre-launch allottees of shares or options in a hot new
issue.
There is also a long history in Hong Kong of front-running by
brokers, of kick-backs between brokers and investment banks and fund
managers. The public gets occasional glimpses of what goes on, but
most remains hidden. The losers are usually either small investors
or those investing through collective vehicles such as unit trusts.
That is in addition to the layers of intermediary fees and
commissions.
So who is going to apply the principle of caveat emptor to the
billions in MPF funds, at least half of which are likely to be
invested in local equities? Forced savings schemes are fine in
theory but give little scope to caveat emptor. The Singapore Central
Provident Fund, for instance, is very safe and has a low expense
ratio but a tiny real yield, pegged to the savings-bank rate. The
Malaysian state pension scheme used to be invested in safe
government bonds with reasonable yields. But lately it has been used
as a cash box for rescuing badly run companies with good political
connections.
So what fate then for Hong Kong's forced savers? Caveat, caveat,
caveat ...
Philip Bowring (bowring@attglobal.net) is a
Hong Kong-based journalist and commentator.
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