Hongkong's Miracle Statistics
Do you sincerely believe that the "real"
Hongkong economy grew 14% in the first quarter of this year? A straw
poll suggests that few do, with even some of the ever bullish stock
brokerage salesmen/economists expressing reservations.
In itself one wacky number, or even a
series, may not matter very much. But as the once much praised Housing
Authority has found, a reputation once tarnished is difficult to re-embellish.
Those in charge of Hongkong statistics did not enhance their reputations
last year with the bizarre and hastily compiled estimates they put out
- in contradiction of their own previous assessments - of the numbers
of mainland born illegitimate children of Hongkong residents. Likewise
their assessments of the commercial benefits of the government's investment
of land, concessions and cash in Disney were sorely lacking in the detailed
and independent analysis that such departments should provide.
So it is reasonable to submit the 14%
growth claim to further analysis and ask whether figures are being presented
so as to please the ear of the Chief Executive and make life easier
for spokesman Stephen Lam. Spin doctoring is the legitimate occupation
of spin doctors, not of statisticians. How did Hongkong suddenly vault
to the top of the Asian recovery league overtaking Malaysia, Korea and
other beneficiaries of low exchange rates, low interest rates and superior
exports?
The most basic fact in the First Quarter
data is that in terms of current Hongkong dollars, what you and I and
every firm uses, total GDP grew by 6.2% compared with the same period
last year. Within the constraints of GDP data generally, this is not
an unreasonable figure. We know that trade and tourism have picked up
very strongly compared with the abyss a year ago and that private consumption
is reviving. However we also know that unemployment though falling gradually
is still at a high 5.5%, that interest rates are high and rising and
that there is no appetite for investing in that once sacred cow, real
estate.
So 6.2% or a bit more to take account
of some price falls seems reasonable. How then do we get to 14%? Answer:
Throw in a negative GDP deflator of a whopping 7.1% so that 6.2% growth
in money terms translates into 14.3% in so-called "real" terms. In other
words, prices across the economy are supposed to have declined by 7%,
making us that much better off in real terms. But is this really the
case?
Take consumer prices. These, according
to the government, fell 5.1% in the first quarter compared with a year
ago. But analysis shows this to be huge exaggeration of reality. The
biggest contributor to the CPI fall was housing which accounts for 29%
of the composite index. According to the data, housing costs overall
fell 10.3%. But this figure is a nonsense. Cost of public housing, which
accommodates 45% of the population was down 0.6%. The rest of the index
is based on private rental. But less than 10% of people live in private
rented accommodation. The rest are owner occupiers who are primarily
affected by mortgage rates which are not included anywhere in the CPI.
For the record, the average prime rate was marginally lower in the first
quarter than a year earlier - 8.6% compared with 8.7% in Q1 1999. Adjust
housing to the real world, an overall composite CPI fall of 2.5% seems
more realistic.
But the official CPI figure is at least
explicable, even if the data used is flawed. That cannot be said for
the 7.1% GDP deflator which is telling us that overall prices have been
falling even faster than the CPI. Oh yes? First lets take a look at
foreign trade which is a huge contributor to GDP, even though most merchandise
trade is now re-export business not local manufacture. The data tells
us that unit values of both imports and total exports were virtually
unchanged over the 12 month period. Local producer prices fell 1% but
those of retained imports actually increased by 2% as terms of trade
and the trade weighted exchange rate index both fell slightly
There are no figures available on service
sector import and export prices but no international indicators, such
as those issued by the US, show no signs of a sharp decline. What about
other local costs? Labour costs, whether measured by nominal wage rates
or average earnings fell 1% while employment increased by 3.6%. Tender
prices for public works fell 4% the building cost index rose 1% The
only cost figure which comes anywhere near the 7.1% deflator is the
rental index for office space - down 6.3% on the year. The retail rental
index actually rose 1% presumably reflecting the pick up in consumption.
Conceivably the 7.1% derives from some
arcane mathematics concerned with the ratio of imports to exports. But
even that would now seem hard to explain given that the merchandise
deficit has returned to more normal levels ($24 bn in Q1) from the very
low number ($13 bn) a year ago when domestic demand was very weak.
So the only number I can find which just
might get us to 7.1% is not even mentioned in the 190 page printed version
of the First Quarter report which merely blandly tells us that "the
momentum of inventory buildup, which began in the middle of 1999, accentuated
further". The data available on the government web site tells us some
details which are nothing short of mind boggling. We learn that in current
prices inventories rose by $5.20 bn. Nothing very unusual there, though
it was a big increase representing 1.7% of GDP for the quarter. However
in constant 1990 prices the inventories rose by almost the same amount
as in current prices -- $5.04 bn.
Are we expected to believe that at a
time when import prices are rising, and even the dubious GDP deflator
is 45% above its 1990 base, inventories are being replenished at the
prices of a decade ago? It is not clear how these inventory numbers
- an erratic guesstimate at the best of times - work their way into
the overall deflator and GDP numbers.
But let us stop kidding ourselves about
14% growth and 7% deflation. What's wrong with 8.5% real growth with
2.3% deflation? Or are we to go down the mainland path of wishful thinking
just at a time when Beijing's national statistical bureau is trying
valiantly to bring some realism to provincial exaggerations? The problem
now is that when the inflation numbers adjust to reality, the headline
"real" GDP is going to look much sicker than it really is. Or other
means will have to be found to achieve a soft landing for the statisticians.
ends
SCMP June 2
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