HONG
KONG The United States and the countries of Southeast Asia
are struggling to know how to respond to the rapid growth of China's
military power. Is it the natural outcome of China's economic
growth, or does it presage a desire on China's part to throw its
weight around in world affairs?
The recent Pentagon
report to Congress on China's armed forces, and last week's meeting
in Laos of ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, were both testimony to the dilemmas faced by big and small
nations alike as the benefits of commerce with China are undercut by
fears that Beijing is building military capability far too fast for
others' comfort.
There is little guide
from history as to how the significance of China's possession of
nuclear armed long range ballistic missiles will affect its
relationship with the United States. Is this a case, as with the
U.S.-Soviet confrontation, of a strategic impasse created by
mutually assured destruction? Or will China's willingness at some
future date to threaten nuclear war over Taiwan prove decisive in
driving U.S. power from the western Pacific?
Southeast Asia, on the
other hand, does present an historical precedent - one that should
be attracting particular attention in 2005. This year is the 600th
anniversary of the first of seven great voyages to south and west by
China's most famous admiral, Zheng He. The anniversary is being
widely celebrated inside and outside China with exhibitions and
articles. The Beijing leadership has paid tribute to the
outward-looking policies of the Ming dynasty during the 15th
century, suggesting that today's commercial engagement with the
world was in the same spirit of trade and openness.
Zheng He is presented by
China as a remarkable commander whose voyages of exploration and
goodwill led to the exchange of knowledge and goods as far afield as
the east coast of Africa. (Chinese historians generally do not
subscribe to the ill-supported claims in the best-selling "1421: The
Year China Discovered America" that Zheng He got there 71 years
before Columbus).
Zheng He was indeed a
remarkable man, but he was neither an "ambassador of peace and
friendship" nor a one-off explorer-navigator. His expeditions, which
followed lesser ones by the Mongol Yuan dynasty, were military. He
was merely the most famous of a number of Chinese admirals who
carried out the expansionist policies of the Ming dynasty for most
of the 15th century. This had huge consequences not only for the
geopolitics of the region but also for its demographics, the region
having hitherto been more subject to Indian than Chinese cultural
influence.
This movement paralleled
expansion of Chinese territory in the north and west. But whereas
China there faced real military threats from the Mongols, its
southward expansion - made possible by its combination of
shipbuilding technology and sheer size - was driven by a desire for
commercial and political hegemony.
On land this included
the annexation of Yunnan, a partially successful attempt to control
Vietnam and interference in the affairs of Burma. By sea it took the
form of expeditions to achieve "regime change" among the small
political entities of Southeast Asia, including detaching the
trading states of Sumatra from allegiance to the Java-based
Majapahit empire. The military forces of Zheng He and others
overthrew rulers as far away as Sri Lanka who would not submit to
Ming hegemony, installing puppets in their place.
Military might ensured
Chinese imperial control of the trade between these entities and
China, which forced them to pay tribute as a condition for
continuing to trade. Trade did indeed flourish with Southeast Asia,
which acquired a taste for Chinese manufactured goods; China, for
its part, took to imported opium, birds' nests and peanuts.
In the wake of the
imperial fleets went traders and adventurers who established the
permanent connections between southern coastal China and Southeast
Asia. Chinese gradually took the place of Arab, Indian and Bugis
traders. The connections continued after Beijing lost interest in
the south seas. The Europeans took their place as feudal overlords
but individual Chinese remained to dominate commerce.
History may not repeat
itself. At the peak of the Ming dynasty, China really was a dominant
power, more like the United States today than China today. There was
no power in either Japan or India to challenge Ming naval hegemony.
But the lure of trade with China and the ease with which China was
able to play divide-and-rule games in Southeast Asia has lessons for
today's Asean countries.
China may prove to be a
gentle giant, but the anniversary of Zheng He's first voyage should
also be a reminder that Ming policy expanded China's geographical
and tributary claims. These are found in its claims to the whole of
the South China Sea, used to justify its seizure of islands from
Vietnam, and Ming-era assumptions of the superiority of Chinese
civilization over its Malay and Indian counterparts.